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Abstract
The Minimal Detectable Bias (MDB) is an important diagnostic tool in data quality control. The MDB
is traditionally computed for the case of testing the null hypothesis against a single alternative hypoth-
esis. The actual practice of statistical testing and data quality control is however one where not one,
but multiple alternative hypotheses are considered. We show that this has two important consequences
for one’s interpretation and use of the popular MDB. Firstly, we demonstrate, theoretically as well as
empirically, that care should be exercised in using the single-hypothesis-based MDB for the multiple-
hypotheses case. Secondly, as detection and identification of an alternative hypothesis do not coincide in
the multiple-hypotheses case, we show that for identification purposes, not the MDB, but the Minimal
Identifiable Bias (MIB) should be used as the proper diagnostic tool. We analyse the circumstances that
drive the differences between the MDBs and MIBs, show how they can be computed using Monte Carlo
simulation, and illustrate by means of examples the significant differences that one can experience between
detectability and identifiability.
Keywords Quality Control, Detection-Identification-Adaptation (DIA), Minimal Detectable Bias (MDB),
Minimal Identifiable Bias (MIB), Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS)
1 Introduction
Statistical testing for modelling errors and biases is an important component of any data quality control
procedure (Alberda 1976; Amiri-Simkooei 2004; Klein et al. 2017, 2015; Yetkin, Berber and Inal 2014). Such
a testing procedure then usually consists of a detection, identification and adaptation (DIA) step (Baarda
1968; Imparato 2016; Teunissen 2000). In the detection step one decides whether they can have enough
confidence in the null-hypothesis H0, which is, at onset, the assumed working model. Once confidence in
H0 has been declared, this model is eventually used to estimate the unknown parameters, usually in a
least-squares sense. In case confidence in H0 is lacking, subsequently identification of the potential source of
model error is carried out. This implies a search among the specified alternative hypotheses Hi, i = 1, ...,m,
for the most likely model misspecification. After successful identification of the suspected model error,
adaptation is needed to perform a corrective action on earlier H0-based inferences. Thus, with the null
hypothesis rejected, the identified alternative hypothesis becomes the new null hypothesis and this model
is then effectively used to provide estimates for the unknown parameters. For the distributional theory of
the DIA-method, including a discussion on how the first moment of the parameter estimators is impacted
by the testing procedure, see (Teunissen 2017; Teunissen, Imparato and Tiberius 2017).
In this contribution we analyse what diagnostic quantities are actually needed to adequately describe
the performance of the testing procedure. We thereby distinguish between detection and identification, and
also between single alternative hypothesis testing and multiple alternative hypotheses testing. For detection,
Baarda (Baarda 1967, 1968) introduced the important and well-known concept of the Minimal Detectable
Bias (MDB). It describes, for each alternative hypothesis Hi, the size of model error or bias that can be
detected with a certain pre-set probability, when employing a detector test with user-defined false alarm rate
(Salzmann 1991; Teunissen 1998; Van der Marel and Kosters 1990). Although the MDB is usually computed
based on Baarda’s normally distributed w-statistic, it can also be linked to the Chi-square distributed overall
model test. The MDB is a general concept that applies in principle to any detection test for validating H0.
Hence, when computing and reporting MDBs, one should always clarify which detection test is actually used
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for validating the null hypothesis. In this contribution, we consider as the alternative hypotheses outliers in
individual observations, and the testing procedure itself will be based on Baarda’s w-test statistic for data
snooping (Baarda 1967). Thus with m observations, there will also be m alternative hypotheses.
There is no difference between detection and identification in case only a single alternative hypothesis
is in play. In that case, rejection of H0 automatically leads to acceptance of the only alternative, and the
corresponding Minimal Detectable Bias (MDB) also describes the smallest bias that can be identified. As this
equivalence disappears in multiple alternative hypotheses testing, one has to be aware of the following two
consequences. Firstly, as a different test statistic will be used for detection, also the MDB of a hypothesis
Hi will then change from the single alternative hypothesis MDB1(i) into the m alternative hypotheses
MDBm(i). Secondly, as identification differs from detection in the m alternative hypotheses case, the
MDBs will not represent the minimal size of biases that one is able to correctly identify. To obtain such
information (Teunissen 2017), one will have to consider — in analogy with the Minimal Detectable Bias
(MDB) — the Minimal Identifiable Bias (MIB). Earlier it has been recognized already (Pro´szyn´ski 2015) that
the MDB does not cover identification. In this contribution we show that for the given testing procedure,
MDBm(i) ≤ MDB1(i) = MIB1(i) ≤ MIBm(i) (1)
This relationship has two implied consequences. Firstly, it shows that the easy-to-compute Minimal De-
tectable Bias MDB1(i) can be used as a safe upper bound for the MDB when m alternative hypotheses are
considered, i. e. MDBm(i). We will analyse the circumstances under which such an approximation can be
considered satisfactory. Secondly, the relationship implies that identification is more difficult than detection.
This is something one has to be aware of when using identified hypotheses for adaptation purposes. The
MDBs cannot be used as safe bounds for the MIBs. We will analyse the circumstances that drive the dif-
ferences between the MDBs and MIBs, and in support of this analysis we also show how the m-hypotheses
MDBs and MIBs can actually be computed using Monte Carlo simulation.
This contribution is organized as follows. We start in section 2 with a brief review of the necessary
estimation and testing results of linear model theory. Then in section 3, we introduce our testing procedure,
give a proof of relation (1) and show how the multivariate minimal biases MDBm(i) and MIBm(i) can be
numerically computed by means of Monte Carlo simulation. In section 4 we provide a qualitative description,
as a function of the normalized bias size and overall false alarm rate, of the behaviour of the univariate and
multivariate probabilities of missed detection and correct identification. Then in section 5 we illustrate
by means of two surveying examples the significant differences that one can indeed experience in practice
between detectability and identifiability. The conclusions and findings are summarized in section 6.
2 Detection and the Minimal Detectable Bias
In this section we briefly review necessary estimation and testing results of linear model theory.
2.1 Detection
Before any start can be made with statistical model validation, one needs to have a clear idea of the models
one wants to work with. The null-hypothesis H0, also referred to as working hypothesis, consists of the
model one believes to be valid under nominal, or normal working conditions. We assume the null-hypothesis
to be of the form
H0 : E(y) = Ax , D(y) = Qyy (2)
with E(.) the expectation operator, y ∈ Rm the normally distributed random vector of observables, A ∈ Rm×n
the known design matrix of rank n, and x ∈ Rn the unknown parameter vector. D(.) is the dispersion
operator andQyy ∈ Rm×m the known positive-definite variance matrix of the observables. As A is assumed to
be of full rank, the redundancy of the model is r = m−n. For example, in case of GNSS satellite positioning,
the model (2) is formed by the linear(ized) pseudorange code and/or carrier-phase observation equations; see
e. g. Hofmann-Wellenhof, Lichtenegger and Wasle (2008); Leick (2004); Teunissen and Montenbruck (Eds.).
The first step in testing usually consists of a check on the overall validity of the null-hypothesis H0. Such
a detection-step provides information on whether one can have confidence in the assumed null hypothesis.
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By choosing an acceptance region Aα ⊂ Rm, the test takes the form
Accept H0 if y ∈ Aα, reject otherwise (3)
The performance of such a test is described by its probabilities of false alarm PFA and missed detection
PMD,
PFA = P [y 6∈ Aα|H0 = true] = α
PMD = P [y ∈ Aα|H0 = false] = β (4)
The probability of false alarm α, also known as significance level, is the probability of rejecting the null-
hypothesis while it is true in fact (also known as a type-I error), while the probability of missed detection β is
the probability of wrongfully accepting the null-hypothesis (also known as a type-II error). The complement
to the probability of missed detection, PCD = 1 − PMD = γ, is the probability of correct detection, also
known as the power of the test. The false alarm probability can be computed by means of a multivariate
integration of the null-hypothesis’ probability density function of y over the complement of Aα. For the
computation of the missed detection, however, we first need to specify the alternative hypothesis Ha to
which H0 is tested against. Here we consider the following type of alternative hypotheses,
Ha : E(y) = Ax+ Cb , D(y) = Qyy (5)
with by = Cb the additional observation bias-vector, in which b ∈ Rq is unknown and matrix C ∈ Rm×q
known. We have q ≤ m − n = r, as the design matrix under Ha, [A,C] ∈ Rm×(n+q), is assumed to be of
full rank. Through the choice of matrix C one may model, for instance in GNSS applications, the presence
of one or more blunders (outliers) in the code (pseudorange) data, cycle-slips in carrier-phase data, satellite
failures, antenna-height errors, or incorrect neglectance of atmospheric delays.
For each possible alternative hypothesis Ha, i. e. for each choice of matrix C and set values for the
elements of vector b, one may compute the probability of missed detection PMD. This boils down to a
multivariate integration of the alternative hypothesis’ probability density function of y over the acceptance
region Aα ⊂ Rm. Alternatively, as one is often interested in the ’size’ of bias vector b that can be detected
with a certain pre-set probability, one may instead follow the inverse route. In that case one assumes a certain
probability of missed detection, PMD = β say, and then computes for a given C-matrix, the corresponding
b-vector. This latter approach then leads to the concept of the Minimal Detectable Bias as introduced by
Baarda (1967).
2.2 Minimal Detectable Bias (MDB)
No particular choice for the acceptance region Aα ofH0 has yet been made. Different choices lead to different
probabilities of missed detection for the same Ha. A commonly used choice is given by Baarda (1968) and
by (Teunissen 2000),
Aα = {y ∈ Rm | ||eˆ||2Qyy ≤ χ2α(r, 0)} (6)
with the least-squares residual vector eˆ = P⊥Ay, orthogonal projector P
⊥
A = Im − A(ATQ−1yy A)−1ATQ−1yy ,
||eˆ||2Qyy = eˆTQ−1yy eˆ, and critical value χ2α(r, 0). The critical value is computed from the central Chi-square
distribution with r = m − n degrees of freedom and a chosen false alarm rate, or level of significance, α.
The detection-test with the above acceptance region (6) is referred to as the overall-model test (OMT). It is
known to be a uniformly-most-powerful-invariant (UMPI) detector test, from Arnold (1981); Lehmann and
Voß-Bo¨hme (2017); Teunissen (2000), when testing (2) against (5).
In order to determine the OMT’s probability of missed detection, we need the distribution of the
’weighted-sum-of-squared-residuals’ test statistic ||eˆ||2Qyy under Ha. It is given as
||eˆ||2Qyy ∼ χ2(r, λq) (7)
with non-centrality parameter λq = b
TQ−1
bˆbˆ
b, in which Qbˆbˆ = (C¯
TQ−1yy C¯)−1 is the variance matrix of the
best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) of b under Ha, and C¯ = P⊥AC. From combining (6) and (7), the
probability of missed detection for hypothesis Ha follows as PMD = P [χ2(r, λq) ≤ χ2α(r, 0)] = β.
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This relation can also be used as a starting point for computing the OMT’s Minimal Detectable Biases.
First, the non-centrality parameter λq is computed from this relation as a function of α, β and r, denoted
as λq(α, β, r), the value of which provides then a yardstick for the detectable bias,
λq(α, β, r) = b
TQ−1
bˆbˆ
b = ||C¯b||2Qyy (8)
This quadratic equation describes a hyper-ellipsoid in Rq for the bias b. Biases outside this region will have
a larger than γ = 1 − β probability of being detected under Ha using the OMT, while biases inside it will
have a smaller probability. A further inversion is possible to find the corresponding biases themselves. Let
u be a unit vector (||u|| = 1) and parametrize the bias vector as b = ||b||u. Substitution into (8), followed
by inversion gives then,
b =
√
λq(α, β, r)
||C¯u||2Qyy
u with ||u|| = 1 (9)
This is the vectorial form of Baarda’s Minimal Detectable Bias (MDB) (Baarda 1967, 1968). Baarda referred
to his MDBs as ’boundary values’ (in Dutch: grenswaarden); nowadays more customary term MDB was
introduced in Teunissen (1989). The length ||b|| of the MDB vector is the smallest magnitude of the bias
vector b that can be found with at least probability γ = 1−β in the direction u using the detection-test (6).
By letting u vary over the unit sphere in Rq, one obtains the whole range of MDBs that can be detected with
probability γ. Applications can be found, for example, in Kok (1982); Van Mierlo (1980) for deformation
analysis, in (Salzmann 1991; Tiberius 1998) for GNSS positioning and navigation and in Teunissen (1986)
for trend testing.
Baarda, in his work on the strength analysis of general purpose geodetic networks, applied his general
MDB-form to data snooping for outlier detection of DGCC (1982). In that case q = 1, and the m alternative
hypotheses take the form
Hi : E(y) = Ax+ cibi , i = 1, . . . ,m , D(y) = Qyy (10)
with ci being the canonical unit vector having 1 as its ith entry and zeroes otherwise. Since σ
2
bˆi
= ||c¯i||−2Qyy
when q = 1, the corresponding scalar MDBs, MDB(i) = |bi|, for each of these m hypotheses can then be
computed as
MDB(i) = σbˆi
√
λq=1(α, β, r) , i = 1, . . . ,m (11)
The MDB gets smaller for larger α, larger β (smaller power γ) and smaller σbˆi (more precisely estimated
bˆi).
3 Detection and Identification
In the remainder of this contribution we restrict our attention to alternative hypotheses of the form (10),
i. e. we restrict our attention to data snooping. And instead of detection only (accept or reject H0), we are
now also interested in identification of the correct hypothesis.
3.1 Test procedure
There would be no difference between detection and identification in case there would be only a single
alternative hypothesis, i. e. if one would assume that only one of two hypotheses could be true, H0 or Ha. In
that case rejection of H0 automatically implies acceptance of Ha. In our case, however, we will be working
with multiple alternatives. This implies that rejection of H0 still requires a further identification as to which
of the m alternatives to accept.
For data snooping we make use of Baarda’s w-test statistic, see Baarda (1968),
wi =
cTi Q
−1
yy eˆ√
cTi Q
−1
yy QeˆeˆQ
−1
yy ci
∼ N
(
bi
σbˆi
, 1
)
(12)
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The UMPI-test for testing H0 against a single alternative Hi of (10) would then be to reject H0 in favour
of Hi if y 6∈ Aiα1 , with the acceptance region given as Aiα1 = {y ∈ Rm | |wi| ≤ χα1(1, 0)}, with χα1(1, 0) =√
χ2α1(1, 0). In our case however, we do not have a single alternative, but multiple alternative hypotheses.
We therefore take as the acceptance region for H0 the intersection of the m individual acceptance regions
Aiα1 , i = 1, . . . ,m. We thus accept the null-hypothesis if y ∈ Aαm = ∩mi=1Aiα1 (i. e. if none of the m w-tests
gets rejected), and reject otherwise. But as this is only the detection-part of the testing procedure, we still
need to decide which Hi to choose once H0 is rejected. Here we choose for Hi if its wi is largest in absolute
value. The testing procedure can be summarized as
Accept H0 if max
j∈{1,...,m}
|wj | ≤ k = χα1(1, 0) (13)
otherwise
Accept Hi if |wi| = max
j∈{1,...,m}
|wj | > k = χα1(1, 0) (14)
Hence, (13) is the detection-step, and (14) the identification-step. Note, since we are here solely working
with the m wi-statistics and alternative hypotheses of the form (10), that detector (13) is different from the
one based on (6). The detector based on (6) is ellipsoidal shaped, while detector (13) is constructed from
the intersections of m banded regions Aiα1 , i = 1, . . . ,m. The two regions are shown in Figure 1, with (6)
on the left, and (13) on the right (note: the region Aiα is shown to be spherical (circular) in the figure as
the used metric is with respect to Qyy).
𝑤𝑤1
𝑤𝑤2 𝑤𝑤3
𝐻𝐻0
𝐻𝐻1
𝐻𝐻3
𝐻𝐻2
𝑤𝑤1
𝑤𝑤2 𝑤𝑤3
𝐻𝐻0
𝐻𝐻1
𝐻𝐻3
𝐻𝐻2
𝐻𝐻
Figure 1: Two examples of acceptance regions for H0: ellipsoidal acceptance region Aα (cf. 6) of the overall
model test (left; dark green), and polygonal acceptance region Aαm (cf. 13) of the multiple wi-test (right;
dark green). The light-green banded regions are those of Aiα1 , i = 1, 2, 3, for resp. H1, H2 and H3 (m = 3).
As the two acceptance regions are different, their MDBs for the same alternative hypothesis Hi will be
different as well, even when the same false alarm PFA and the same missed detection probability PMD are
chosen. It is therefore important to explicitly describe the underlying testing procedure when presenting
MDBs.
3.2 Minimal Detectable Bias revisited
As the MDB depends on the chosen detector, the MDBs for (13) will differ from the OMT-based ones of
(11). For the probability of missed detection through (13) PMDm we have, since Aαm = ∩mi=1Aiα1 ,
PMDm(i) = P[y ∈ Aαm |Hi] ≤ P[y ∈ Aα1 |Hi] = PMD1(i) (15)
in which PMD1(i) is the missed detection probability in case one would have only one alternative hypothesis
Hi (PMD with index 1 denotes the univariate probability of missed detection, and PMD with index m the
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multi-variate probability of missed detection). To contribute to the PMDm(i) the observation y needs to
lie in the intersection of all m individual acceptance regions, so that none of them gets rejected, while, in
fact, Hi is true. The intersection is a smaller area than each of the individual ones; hence, the probability
gets smaller, PMDm(i) ≤ PMD1(i). Thus, the missed detection probability gets smaller in case of multiple
testing. The false alarm rate however, will generally get larger, αm ≥ α1. Would the wi-test-statistics all
be independent, then 1 − αm = (1 − α1)m, which for small α1 can be approximated as 1 − αm ≈ 1 −mα1
or αm ≈ mα1. This approximation generally works quite well in practice, especially for small false alarm
probabilities, unless the underlying model is too weak, having low redundancy and/or very correlated wi-
test-statistics. For the correlated case, we have the upper bound, αm ≤ mα1, which is known as the
Bonferroni inequality (Bonferroni 1936).
Although the right-hand side of the inequality (15) is usually easy to compute (with a one-dimensional
normally distributed random variable, PMD1(i) = P[|wi| < k|Hi]), the computation of the multivariate
missed detection probability PMDm(i) itself generally needs a Monte Carlo integration. This is due to the
geometric complexity of the acceptance region Aαm (see Figure 1 at right). In the next section we will
provide a qualitative analysis of the upper bound (15) together with an quantitative investigation of its
closeness.
Similar to the PMD-inequality (15), we have the MDB-inequality (with 11)
MDBm(i) ≤ MDB1(i) = σbˆi
√
λq=1(α1, β, 1) (16)
The right-hand side is the easy-to-use MDB-formula one often uses for computing the MDBs of data snoop-
ing. Hence, this result shows that these MDBs can be used as safe bounds for the actual values MDBm(i).
In a next section, the two will be compared for various examples.
3.3 The Minimal Identifiable Bias (MIB)
Next to detection, we have identification (cf. 14). The MDBm’s of (16) are minimal detectable biases, but
not minimal identifiable biases (Teunissen 2017). To determine the MIBs, we start from the complement of
PMD being the probability of correct detection, PCD = 1 − PMD. As correct detection does not necessarily
imply correct identification (this is only the case with m = 1), the probability of correct detection is the sum
of the probability of correct identification (selecting the single correct alternative) and the probability of
wrong identification (selecting one of the m− 1 other alternatives): PCD = PCI +PWI. Thus the probability
of correct identification is smaller than that of correct detection. As a consequence the MIBs will be larger
than their MDB counterparts,
PCI ≤ PCD =⇒ MIB ≥ MDB (17)
This shows that one has to be careful in using MDBs as MIBs. It is one thing to be able to detect a bias,
but an all together other thing is to also be able to identify it.
For the probability of correct identification, we have similarly to (15), the inequality
PCIm(i) = P [|wi| = max
j
|wj | > k|Hi] ≤ P [|wi| > k|Hi] = PCI1(i) = 1− PMD1(i) (18)
On the right-hand side, test-statistic wi shall exceed, in absolute sense, the critical value k, and on the left-
hand side, in addition, wi needs to be the largest of all m w test-statistics, resulting in a smaller probability.
The last equality follows from the fact that correct identification equals correct detection in case one would
have only the one alternative hypothesis Hi. From the probabilistic inequality (18) follows for the Minimal
Identifiable Biases,
MIBm(i) ≥ MIB1(i) = MDB1(i) (19)
3.4 Computing the MDBs and MIBs
The univariate Minimal Detectable Bias MDB1(i) is relatively easy to compute using the expression (16).
The computation of MDBm(i) and MIBm(i), however, is more involved and needs to be based on simulation.
First we need to be able to determine the acceptance region Aαm for a user-given value of the overall
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false alarm rate αm. Thus given αm, we need to be able to compute α1 or k = χα1(1, 0), thereby giving
Aαm = ∩mi=1Aiα1 . The procedure of computing α1 from αm is a problem already addressed in (Lehmann 2010,
2011) and can briefly be described as follows: simulate N samples from the H0-distribution of the m-vector
of w-test-statistics w = [w1, w2, . . . wm]
T H0∼ N (0, Qww), with (Qww)ii = 1 and (Qww)ij = ρ(wi, wj) being
the correlation between wi and wj . The ith entry of the vth such sample is denoted as w
v
i . Then sort out in
ascending order the maximum components w˜v = maxiw
v
i , with v ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, and compute (Lehmann
2012; Lemeshko and Lemeshko 2005):
k =
1
2
(
w˜b(1−αm)Ne + w˜b(1−αm)N+1e
)
(20)
where the subscript of w˜ (b(1− αm)Ne and b(1− αm)N + 1e) is the rounded ordinal number that indicates
the position of the selected elements in the ascendingly sorted list of w˜v. From the above computed k, the
corresponding univariate false alarm rate is computed as α1 = χ
−1
k (1, 0).
With k (or α1) known, Aαm = ∩mi=1Aiα1 is known, thus making it possible to compute the multivariate
missed detection probability PMD through simulation. Again N samples are drawn, but now from the
Hj-distribution of w = [w1, w2, . . . wm]T Hj∼ N (bw, Qww), in which the ith entry of bw is given as
E(wi|Hj) = ρ(wi, wj) bj
σbˆj
(21)
By counting the number of missed detections in the generated samples, one can determine the corresponding
probability of missed detection. Thus if N is the total number of samples simulated, we first count the
number of times nMD(bj) that
⋂m
i=1 |wvi | < k for v = 1, . . . , N , and then approximate the probability of
missed detection as
PMDm(bj) ≈
nMD(bj)
N
(22)
The probability of correct identification PCIm(bj) is computed in a similar manner, although the counting
is now based on the number of times that Hj is correctly identified, i. e. how often |wvj | = maxi |wvi | > k
for v = 1, . . . , N . As the approximation (22) gets better for larger N , the question is how large a sample
should be chosen. Using the results of (Tanizaki 2004) we found that for our purposes N = 105 is sufficient
to compute probabilities of order 10−3 or larger, with high accuracy.
The computed probabilities PMDm(bj) and PCIm(bj) depend on bj , i. e. on the assumed size of the bias
under Hj . Thus in order to extract the MDB and MIB, the above simulations need to be repeated for
a range of bj-values, so that finally the minimal detectable and identifiable biases can be computed for a
certain chosen fixed reference probability γ (e. g. γ = 0.8) as
MDBm = arg minbj PMDm(bj) < 1− γ
MIBm = arg minbj PCIm(bj) > γ
(23)
4 A qualitative description
In this section we provide a qualitative description of the behaviour of the univariate and multivariate
probabilities of missed detection and correct identification.
4.1 Detection
We consider a simple model with A = [1, . . . , 1]T and D(y) = Im. The data have been simulated with a bias
in the first observable, i. e. the true hypothesis is Hi=1. The bias size b was varied and the simulations were
done for m = 4 and m = 10. Figure 2 (at left for m = 4, and at right for m = 10) shows the graphs of PMDm
(full line) and PMD1 (dashed line) as a function of the normalized bias size b/σbˆ for five different values of
αm. The general characteristic of the probability of missed detection as a function of bias-size b, precision
σbˆ, false alarm rate αm or critical value k, is as follows:
PMD ↓ if b/σbˆ ↑ and/or αm ↑ (k ↓) (24)
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Thus the PMD gets smaller for larger biases, more precisely estimated biases, larger false alarm rates and
smaller critical values. This is explained by the fact that in each of these cases the probability mass of the
w-test-statistic over the acceptance region gets smaller. Either the PDF of the w-statistic moves away from
the acceptance region when b/σbˆ gets larger, or the acceptance region itself gets smaller when either α gets
larger, or k gets smaller.
Also note that PMD1 (dashed line) gets larger when m gets larger (compare left and right graphs of
Figure 2). This is due to the decrease in α1. When the overall false alarm rate αm is kept fixed, a smaller α1
(and thus larger critical value k) needs to be chosen when the number of hypotheses m increases. Increasing
k increases the acceptance region and thus PMD.
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Figure 2: PMDm (full line) as a function of the normalized bias size b/σbˆ, for different values of αm, in
comparison with the upperbound PMD1 (dashed lines). For the model A = [1, . . . , 1]
T ∈ Rm and D(y) = Im
with on the left the case m = 4 (σbˆ = 1.155m) and on the right the case m = 10 (σbˆ = 1.054m.)
From Figure 2 one can also observe the difference PMD1 − PMDm . It follows that
PMD1 − PMDm ↓ if b/σbˆ ↑ and/or αm ↓ (k ↑) (25)
This behaviour can be explained by means of the illustration given in Figure 3 at left. It shows for m = 2,
the regions Aαm (dark green), A1α1 (light green), and A2α1 (light green) in case the two w-test-statistics are
independent. When b/σbˆ gets larger, the PDF of w1 under H1 (illustrated by a circle) translates to the right
and the probability mass over the region A1α1/Aαm (indicated by the yellow area) gets smaller, therefore
making the difference PMD1 −PMDm smaller too. A similar explanation can be given for when k gets larger,
or when αm gets smaller.
4.2 Identification
We now consider identification. Figure 4 shows for the same model the graphs of PCIm (full line) and PCI1
(dashed line) as a function of the normalized bias size b/σbˆ for five different values of αm (at left for m = 4
and at right for m = 10). The general characteristic of the probability of correct identification as a function
of bias-size b, precision σbˆ, false alarm rate αm or critical value k is as follows:
PCI ↑ if b/σbˆ ↑ and/or αm ↑ (k ↓) (26)
Larger biases and/or more precisely estimated biases have a larger chance of being correctly identified. Also
increasing the false alarm rate, thus reducing the acceptance region, obviously leads to larger probabilities
of correct identification.
Also note that PCI1 (dashed line) gets smaller when m gets larger (compare left and right graphs of
Figure 4). This is due to the decrease in α1. When the overall false alarm rate αm is kept fixed, a smaller α1
(and thus larger critical value k) needs to be chosen when the number of hypotheses m increases. Increasing
k increases the acceptance region and thus decreases PCI.
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Figure 3: Left: PMD1 − PMD2 (yellow area) gets smaller if b/σbˆ gets larger. Right: PCI1 − PCIm (red area)
gets smaller if a small b/σbˆ gets even smaller and if a large b/σbˆ gets even larger. The joint PDF of w1 and
w2 is represented by a circle. The two diagonal lines in each figure denote the boundaries of identification
between the two hypotheses, cf. (14)
We also see that PCI 6= 0 for b = 0. In that case PCI reduces to the false alarm rate for single alternative
hypothesis testing, while for multiple alternative hypothesis testing it then reduces to a fraction of the false
alarm rate, namely the probability by which the particular hypothesis will lead to wrongfull detection. For
m hypotheses an approximation of this fraction is α1 ≈ 1mαm.
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Figure 4: PCIm (full line) as a function of the normalized bias size b/σbˆ, for different values of αm, in
comparison with the upperbound PCI1 (dashed lines). For the model A = [1, . . . , 1]
T ∈ Rm and D(y) = Im,
with on the left the case m = 4 (σbˆ = 1.155m) and on the right the case m = 10 (σbˆ = 1.054m).
For the difference PCI1 − PCIm we have
PCI1 − PCIm ↓ if b/σbˆ ↓ 0 or b/σbˆ ↑ ∞ and/or αm ↓ (k ↑) (27)
This behaviour can be explained by means of the illustration given in Figure 3 at right. It shows that the
difference PCI1 − PCI2 gets smaller if an already small b/σbˆ gets smaller (purple area) or when an already
large b/σbˆ gets larger (red area). But note that the purple area and red area both get larger when k gets
smaller, thus explaining why the difference (27) gets smaller when k gets larger or αm gets smaller.
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4.3 MDBs and MIBs compared
It follows from (16) and (19) that
MDBm(i) ≤ MDB1(i) = MIB1(i) ≤ MIBm(i) (28)
This clearly shows the impact of testing multiple alternative hypotheses. There is no difference between
detection and identification in case of a single alternative hypothesis. With an increase in the number of
hypotheses, however, the MDBs get smaller, while the MIBs get larger. It may seem strange that the MDBs
get smaller by merely increasing the number of hypotheses. This however is a dimensionality effect and due
to the increase in intersections of Aαm = ∩mi=1Aiα1 when m gets larger. With this increase in m, also the
overall false alarm rate αm gets larger.
The relation (28) shows that the easy-to-compute MDB1(i) can be used as a safe upper bound for its
multivariate counterpart. This is not the case however for the MIBs. Figure 5 shows for the same earlier
example, a comparison between MDBm(1), MDB1(1) and MIBm(1) as a function of αm for PMD = 0.2.
First note that all get smaller if either αm or m gets larger. This is explained as follows. If the false alarm
rate gets larger, then k gets smaller and thus Aαm and Aα1 get smaller. This implies, when PMD is kept
unchanged, that the MDBs and MIBs get smaller. The impact of m is due to the improved precision with
which the bias can be estimated.
Figure 5 also shows that the difference between MDBm(i) and MIBm(i) is small for small αm, but that
it gets more pronounced when αm gets larger. This is due to the difference between the probabilities of
correct detection and correct identification, PCD − PCI. This difference gets more pronounced if αm gets
larger. If αm gets larger, then the acceptance region gets smaller as a result of which PCD increases more
than an individual PCI.
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Figure 5: MDBm(1), MDB1(1) and MIBm(1) as functions of αm for PCD and PCI set at γ = 0.8. For the
model A = [1, . . . , 1]T ∈ Rm and D(y) = Im, with on the left the case m = 4 (σbˆ = 1.155m) and on the right
the case m = 10 (σbˆ = 1.054m).
5 Terrestrial and Satellite Positioning
In this section we illustrate by means of two practical surveying examples the significant differences one can
experience between detectability and identifiability.
5.1 A planar surveying triangle
Consider the two-dimensional surveying triangle of Figure 6. We assume distance and azimuth measure-
ments. The linearized observation equations for distance lij and azimuth aij between points i and j read
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Figure 6: A two-dimensional planar surveying triangle
then
∆lij =
x0ij
lij
∆xij +
y0ij
lij
∆yij
∆aij =
y0ij
l2ij
∆xij − x
0
ij
l2ij
∆yij
(29)
in which ∆xij and ∆yij are the increments of the unknown coordinate differences xij = xj − xi and yij =
yj − yi, respectively. The coordinates of point 1 are assumed to be known. In total, nine observations
are available (three distances and six azimuth measurements). Hence, the redundancy equals 5 as there
are 4 unknowns (the coordinates of two stations). The observations are assumed normally distributed,
uncorrelated and with standard deviations given as
σlij = 1cm
σaij
lij
= 1cm
(30)
Figure 7 shows the univariate and multivariate probabilities of missed detection (PMDm ,PMD1) and
correct identification (PCIm ,PCI1), together with their minimal biases (MDBm, MDB1, MIBm), as functions
of the normalized bias size b/σbˆ for five different values of αm. We observe a very similar behaviour as
discussed for the averaging model of the previous section. The difference between the actual PMDm and
its upperbound PMD1 increases with decreasing bias size and increasing false alarm rate αm. Also for
identification, the behaviour of the difference between PCIm and its upperbound PCI1 , is very similar to
what we saw earlier. However, note that this difference is now much larger. This can also be seen in the
difference between MDBm and MIBm. For instance for αm = 0.1, MDBm = 4.2m and MIBm = 5.3m, an
over 25% difference. The reason for these larger differences lies in the strength of the underlying model and
the available redundancy. In the averaging model of the previous section, redundancy took a larger fraction
of the number of observations, namely 34 = 0.75 and
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10 = 0.9, respectively, than in the current surveying
example, for which this fraction is 59 = 0.56. The lower this fraction is, the more difficult one can expect
correct identification to be. In the following section we show a more extreme example of this effect.
5.2 GNSS single point positioning
We consider GNSS single point positioning for a GPS-only scenario and compare it to a GPS+Galileo
scenario. The two different receiver-satellite geometries are depicted in Figure 8. In the GPS-only case, the
m× 4 design matrix A and pseudorange variance matrix Qyy are structured as
A =
 1 −u
T
1
...
...
1 −uTm
 , Qyy = diag(σ21, . . . , σ2m) (31)
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Figure 7: Surveying triangle. On the left, PMDm (full) and PMD1 (dashed), and in the middle, PCIm (full)
and PCI1 (dashed), as functions of the normalized bias b/σbˆ (assuming outlier in distance observation l23),
for different values of αm (σbˆ = 1.4cm). At the right, MDBs and MIB as functions of αm for γ = 0.8.
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Figure 8: Two GNSS skyplots for Delft, the Netherlands. Left: GPS-only skyplot with m = 6 and redun-
dancy r = 2; Right: GPS+Galileo skyplot with m = 17 and redundancy r = 12. GPS PRNs in blue and
(planned) Galileo PRNs in red.
with ui being the ith receiver-satellite unit direction vector. The unknown parameter vector consists of the
receiver clock offset and the increments to the three receiver position coordinates.The stochastic model is
based on ionosphere-free observations (from dual frequency L1 and L5), with the entries of the diagonal
variance matrix constructed according to (Choi et al. 2011; Rippl et al. 2014), see also chapter 7 of (Imparato
2016). For the design matrix of the dual-system GPS+Galileo, an additional column is added to the above
design matrix A so as to take care of the inter-system bias or system-specific receiver clock offset.
Figure 9 shows the univariate and multivariate probabilities of missed detection and correct identification,
together with their minimal biases. Although again we observe globally a similar behaviour as discussed
before, we now clearly see what impact the model strength has on the detection and identification capabilities
of the testing procedure. In the weak GPS-only case, the MIBm exceeds its lowerbound MDB1 by more than
a factor of 4. The differences between the GPS-only case and the GPS+Galileo case are very significant.
The same is true for the fraction their redundancy takes of the number of observations, namely 26 = 0.33
versus 1217 = 0.71. These results show how detection and identification fundamentally differ and how the
capability of the latter can quickly be compromised when the strength of the model becomes too weak.
6 Conclusions
In this contribution we have discussed and analysed the performance of detection and identification of a
DIA-testing procedure. We thereby discriminated between single alternative hypothesis testing and mul-
tiple alternative hypotheses testing. For detection, we have Baarda’s well-known concept of the Minimal
Detectable Bias (MDB). It describes for a specific alternative hypothesis Hi, the smallest size of model error
or bias that can be detected with a certain pre-set probability, when employing a detector test with user-
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Figure 9: GNSS single point positioning. On the left, PMDm (full) and PMD1 (dashed), and in the middle,
PCIm (full) and PCI1 (dashed), as functions of the normalized bias b/σbˆ, for different values of αm. At the
right, MDBs and MIB as functions of αm for γ = 0.8. Top row, weak GPS-only case of Figure 8 at left, with
outlier in PRN 5 (σbˆ = 1.69m); bottom row, strong GPS+Galileo case of Figure 8 at right, with outlier in
PRN 12 (σbˆ = 1.14m).
defined false alarm rate. As the MDB depends on the chosen detection test, we pointed out that the MDB
for single alternative hypothesis testing may differ from that of multiple alternative hypotheses testing. We
analysed the difference and indicated the circumstances under which the easy-to-compute MDB1(i) can be
considered to be a good upper bound for MDBm(i).
Next to detection, we have identification. The MDBs are Minimal Detectable Biases, but not Minimal
Identifiable Biases. As the probability of correct identification is smaller than that of correct detection, the
MIBs are larger than their MDB counterparts,
MIB ≥ MDB (32)
This shows that one has to be careful in using MDBs as MIBs. It is one thing to be able to detect a bias,
but an all together other thing is to also be able to identify it. We have made this distinction clear by
means of a detailed qualitative analysis and description of the probabilities of missed detection and correct
identification as a function of the normalized bias size and overall false alarm rate. This was then further
illustrated by means of two practical surveying examples with varying model strength.
As there are, in contrast to the single alternative hypothesis case, no easy-to-compute expressions avail-
able for the m-hypotheses MIBs and MDBs, we have also shown how they can be computed by means of
Monte Carlo simulation. Such computation first determines the acceptance region from the user-defined
overall false alarm rate αm. Then, for any given bias-range of the hypothesis, the probabilities of correct
detection and correct identification are simulated. The so obtained functions are ‘inverted’ to obtain the
required MDB or MIB, respectively, for the given user-defined reference probability.
Future studies on the subject may want to address the numerical aspects of the MDB and MIB com-
putation, in order to improve the efficiency of the Monte Carlo simulations, and explore ways to obtain
easy-to-compute tight bounds for the MDBs/MIBs.
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